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A New Face: Officer Kimberly Munley November 6, 2009

Posted by Nina Rosenstand in Current Events, Ethics, Nina Rosenstand's Posts, Philosophy of Gender.
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 On a regular basis we discuss the concept of heroism—loosely defined as people stepping up to the plate and acting to help others in need, endangering their own lives—in my Intro to Values classes, evaluating the concept in light of Psychological and Ethical Egoism as well as the various forms of Altruism, Utilitarianism, and Deontology.  And it looks as if we have a new name to add to the list of, shall we say, ordinary people who act decisively, and save lives. Whether we want to use the term “hero” of course depends on how we define it, but what an opportunity to discuss the concept, again! As the news is beginning to pour in, this is the story so far, of the police officer who shot the Fort Hood gunman four times yesterday, putting an end to his killing rampage. Yesterday we heard that she had been killed, but today we know that she survived, and will be returning home:

Here, from NewsPostOnline:

Civilian police officer Kimberley Munley was the one to put an end to this horrifying ordeal. Munley was directing traffic until she heard shots being fired. Military spokesmen. Lt. Cone said Munley and her partner responded within three minutes of the gunfire. Munley, who had been trained in active-response tactics, rushed into the building and confronted the shooter as he was turning a corner, Cone said. “It was an amazing and an aggressive performance by this police officer,” Cone said. Munley shot the gunman four times despite being wounded herself.

And from The Guardian:

Munley was only a few feet from army psychiatrist Major Nidal Malik Hasan when she opened fire.

Munley was reported to be in a stable condition at a local hospital.

She was well enough to spend last night phoning fellow officers to find out about casualties in the attack, the New York Daily News reported.

Cone said Munley’s aggressive response training taught her that “if you act aggressively to take out a shooter you will have less fatalities”.

“She walked up and engaged him,” he said. He praised her as “one of our most impressive young police officers”.

Woman hero Fort Hood1 Kimberly Munley: Hero of the Fort Hood Shooting Rampage

Some might say that it is significant, perhaps a sign of a new era, that it was a fast-acting civilian female police officer who saved the lives of military men. But as was pointed out yesterday, those military men under fire did not have access to weapons, being on-base. And Officer Munley will probably say that for her it was simply a matter of doing what she’s been trained to do. The story may change as it unfolds, and more facts may be added. But right now it looks as if a dreadful situation could have turned even more deadly, had it not been for Officer Munley and her partner.  So is Officer Munley a hero? Let’s say we need to understand the situation a little better before we use the H-word. But did she do something heroic? It certainly looks that way.

The “Folk” are Relativists November 5, 2009

Posted by Dwight Furrow in Culture, Ethics, Philosophy.
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The folks at Experimental Philosophy have some new data supporting the claim that most non-philosophers are ethical relativists, i.e. they believe that standards of rightness and wrongness are determined by cultural norms.

For example, we asked subjects to interpret disagreement on the morality of the following action: “Dylan buys an expensive new knife and tests its sharpness by randomly stabbing a passerby on the street.” When asked whether disagreeing Americans could both be correct in their judgments about the morality of this action, the folk were predictably objectivist.

Things began to shift, though, when the disagreeing individuals were depicted as belonging to different cultural groups. When the disagreement was between an American and a member of an Amazonian warrior culture, or a member of an extraterrestrial species called the Pentars, objectivity levels dropped in turn. It seems as though subjects think that there could be objectively correct moral judgments within cultures, but not between them. The greater the disparity of the cultural groups, the more the folk started to embrace a relativistic conception of morality.

The experimenters express some surprise at these results, but I’m not sure why. Among my students, moral objectivists are rather rare.

book-section-book-cover2 Dwight Furrow is author of

Reviving the Left: The Need to Restore Liberal Values in America

For political commentary by Dwight Furrow visit: www.revivingliberalism.com

 

What is Philosophical Expertise? November 5, 2009

Posted by Dwight Furrow in Dwight Furrow's Posts, Philosophy.
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There is an interesting and important discussion going on at Certain Doubts regarding the nature of philosophical competence or expertise.

The problem arises because there have been (and still are) great philosophers whose work was clearly false and leads us away from the truth. So philosophical competence cannot consist of finding the truth about something.

So what is philosophical expertise? What qualifies someone as an expert at philosophy? (We should exclude cases of someone who is very good at reporting philosophical positions. The question under discussion involves doing philosophy, not reporting it.)

For what it is worth, my own view is that philosophical expertise involves describing logical or phenomenological relationships between concepts and developing standards for evaluating whether such concepts are true. This involves the ability to recognize and clearly express conceptual options, entailment relationships, inconsistencies, and empirical support.

The latter ability requires the help of science whose job it is to actually develop and test empirical claims. Philosophers by contrast have to recognize when those claims provide support for conceptual distinctions.

But what say you?

book-section-book-cover2 Dwight Furrow is author of

Reviving the Left: The Need to Restore Liberal Values in America

For political commentary by Dwight Furrow visit: www.revivingliberalism.com

 

The Virtues of Sadness November 3, 2009

Posted by Dwight Furrow in Dwight Furrow's Posts, Ethics, Science.
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If you’re in a bad mood today, cheer up. At least your mood may be making you smarter.

According to this recent study:

Bad moods can actually be good for you, with an Australian study finding that being sad makes people less gullible, improves their ability to judge others and also boosts memory.

The study, authored by psychology professor Joseph Forgas at the University of New South Wales, showed that people in a negative mood were more critical of, and paid more attention to, their surroundings than happier people, who were more likely to believe anything they were told.

“Whereas positive mood seems to promote creativity, flexibility, cooperation, and reliance on mental shortcuts, negative moods trigger more attentive, careful thinking paying greater attention to the external world,” Forgas wrote.

“Our research suggests that sadness … promotes information processing strategies best suited to dealing with more demanding situations.” […]

The study also found that sad people were better at stating their case through written arguments, which Forgas said showed that a “mildly negative mood may actually promote a more concrete, accommodative and ultimately more successful communication style.”

But don’t cheer up too much; you will lose your edge.

At any rate, it looks like evidence for J.S. Mill’s claim—it is better to be an unhappy Socrates than a contented pig.

Furthermore, it might be that the causal arrow goes in the other direction–accurate assessments of reality make you sad and depressed.

Which might explain all those happy people watching Fox News.

 book-section-book-cover2 Dwight Furrow is author of

Reviving the Left: The Need to Restore Liberal Values in America

For political commentary by Dwight Furrow visit: www.revivingliberalism.com

Kierkegaard to the Rescue! November 2, 2009

Posted by Nina Rosenstand in Nina Rosenstand's Posts, Philosophy, religion.
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I was intrigued when Gordon Marino’s New York Times Op-Ed piece, “Kierkegaard on the Couch,” popped up on my Google meter. (I was also intrigued when I read that aside from being a Kierkegaard expert, Marino is also a boxing trainer. Kierkegaard, being fond of incongruities and ironies, would probably have liked that. At any rate, never at a loss for words, he’d have had something to say about it.)

These days when philosophers hire out as counselors for people whose world view has crumbled, Marino is taking a bold and interesting step, bringing Søren Kierkegaard into the debate about the quintessential contemporary American response to depression: pills, brain scans, and other external mind-pacifying approaches. Can Kierkegaard help us when our despair over life is running high? But not all cases of despair are depression, says Marino:

“These days, confide to someone that you are in despair and he or she will likely suggest that you seek out professional help for your depression. While despair used to be classified as one of the seven deadly sins, it has now been medicalized and folded into the concept of clinical depression. If Kierkegaard were on Facebook or could post a You Tube video, he would certainly complain that we, who have listened to Prozac, have become deaf to the ancient distinction between psychological and spiritual disorders, between depression and despair.”

…..

His lapidary “Sickness Unto Death” is a study of despair, which in the Danish derives from the notion of intensified doubt. Almost as a challenge to keep out the less than earnest reader, Kierkegaard begins “Sickness” with this famous albeit slightly ironic bit of word play:

A human being is a spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation relating itself to itself in the relation.

Marino’s suggestion is to consider the possibility that when we feel an overwhelming malaise about our life and our self, to not go straight to the doctor and ask for Prozac, but to go along with Kierkegaard and explore the condition of the self, considering the possibility that we might learn something about our own spirit and spirituality or lack of it. Not a bad suggestion. Looking into the depths of our own soul before we decide to be medicated into normalcy is a good philosophical approach. But why does Marino stop there? He needs to  share with us the real point of Kierkegaard’s despair analysis.  It is to find God, not just once, but as part of a continual quest. We feel despair (which in Danish is a little different, “fortvivlelse,” more like a profound sadness than despair), says Kierkegaard,  precisely because we feel disconnected when all we find when we look into our selves is our selves looking back at us. And we experience the fundamental doubt. So we need that leap of faith that Kierkegaard’s philosophy is incomprehensible without—and which is so uncomfortable for existentialists who have settled into the atheistic brand of existentialism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy got it right:

But the choice of faith is not made once and for all. It is essential that faith be constantly renewed by means of repeated avowals of faith. One’s very selfhood depends upon this repetition, for according to Anti-Climacus, the self “is a relation which relates itself to itself” (The Sickness Unto Death). But unless this self acknowledges a “power which constituted it,” it falls into a despair which undoes its selfhood. Therefore, in order to maintain itself as a relation which relates itself to itself, the self must constantly renew its faith in “the power which posited it.” There is no mediation between the individual self and God by priest or by logical system (contra Catholicism and Hegelianism respectively). There is only the individual’s own repetition of faith. This repetition of faith is the way the self relates itself to itself and to the power which constituted it, i.e. the repetition of faith is the self.

Is that what Marino wanted to say? Did he know, and chose not to go there, or did he not know? Because you can’t have one part of Kierkegaard without the other: you can’t have the intriguing language games and witty insight into the aesthetic and the ethical mindset without also getting Kierkegaard’s view on faith and religion. You can’t just go half way and assume that Kierkegaard can help us gain a deeper understanding of our self without anti-depressants or therapists, and deselect his actual solution to the problem of despair. What Marino’s suggestion leads to, then, is responding to the sense of modern despair with the old-fashioned question of “Have you found God?” Not a question that appeals to many contemporary thinkers, depressed or not. The debate on the NY Times website is animated, but few get Marino’s point, and even fewer have gotten Kierkegaard’s point. Be that as it may, it was fun to see Søren be dusted off and reintroduced as having a solution to a contemporary problem.

The Good Fight? November 1, 2009

Posted by Nina Rosenstand in Current Events, Nina Rosenstand's Posts, religion.
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I meant to post this as a comment to Dwight’s blog below, but couldn’t figure out how to insert a picture into the comment. So here is the photo, taken by me a few days ago at Costco. Somebody at Costco has a sense of humor—or perhaps a sense of a mission! Right now it looks as if Armstrong has a slight sales edge over Dawkins…

Dawkins vs Armstrong

Gay Marriage November 1, 2009

Posted by Dwight Furrow in Dwight Furrow's Posts, Philosophy of Gender, politics.
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On Tuesday, Maine voters will decide whether to overturn a law permitting gay marriage.

So now is a good time to link to Martha Nussbaum’s recent article in Dissent Magazine that takes seriously but carefully annihilates conservative arguments against gay marriage. It is the best short article I have read on the subject written by one of the most talented philosophers of our time.

Nussbaum provides an account of the history and structure of the institution of marriage and shows why arguments that claim same-sex marriage will harm the institution are without merit. She concludes that

Nothing short of a primitive idea of stigma and taint can explain the widespread feeling that same-sex marriage defiles or contaminates straight marriage, while the marriages of “immoral” and “sinful” heterosexuals do not do so. […]

Like same-sex marriages, cross-racial unions were opposed with a variety of arguments, both political and theological. In hindsight, however, we can see that disgust was at work. […]

The Supreme Court concluded that such ideas of racial stigma were the only ideas that really supported those laws, whatever else was said: “There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification.”
We should draw the same conclusion about the prohibition of same-sex marriage: irrational ideas of stigma and contamination, the sort of “animus” the Court recognized in Romer v. Evans, is a powerful force in its support.

Let’s hope Maine voters do not give in to bigotry on Tuesday.

The Great Non-Sequitur October 29, 2009

Posted by Dwight Furrow in Dwight Furrow's Posts, religion.
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Karen Armstrong’s career has been one long, mighty struggle to make sense of religion. And when she can’t make sense, she just asserts.

In her recent article in Foreign Policy she repeats the most banal of non-sequiturs:

While dogs, as far as we know, do not worry about the canine condition or agonize about their mortality, humans fall very easily into despair if we don’t find some significance in our lives. Theological ideas come and go, but the quest for meaning continues. So God isn’t going anywhere.

Yes, human beings must search for meaning and we are continually threatened by a loss of meaning. But that doesn’t entail that God exists or that humans must believe in God, or that belief in God is an adequate response to the threatened loss of meaning.

I have never been able to figure out, nor has anyone ever adequately explained to me, why life would lack meaning if God did not exist or why belief in God confers meaning on life which it otherwise would not have.

And neither can they explain why hope that God exists is somehow evidence that God must exist.

Yet, writers like Armstrong think this connection is so obvious it doesn’t have to be explained.

book-section-book-cover2 Dwight Furrow is author of

Reviving the Left: The Need to Restore Liberal Values in America

For political commentary by Dwight Furrow visit: www.revivingliberalism.com

 

Dangerous Liaisons October 28, 2009

Posted by Dwight Furrow in Current Events, Dwight Furrow's Posts, religion.
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The Guam legislature is considering a bill to establish domestic partnerships for gays. The Catholic Archbishop with jurisdiction over Guam naturally disapproves, and in a pastoral letter, argues that homosexual relations are “objectively disordered”, and warning the legislature that the bill’s passage would “forfeit its moral authority to govern.”

This is standard fare for the Catholic Church on this issue.

But then the reasoning goes off the deep end. A statement from the Archdiocese argues:

Islamic fundamentalists clearly understand the damage that homosexual behavior inflicts on a culture. That is why they repress such behavior by death. Their culture is anything but one of self-absorption. It may be brutal at times, but any culture that is able to produce wave after wave of suicide bombers (women as well as men) is a culture that at least knows how to value self-sacrifice. Terrorism as a way to oppose the degeneration of the culture is to be rejected completely since such violence is itself another form of degeneracy. One, however, does not have to agree with the gruesome ways that the fundamentalists use to curb the forces that undermine their culture to admit that the Islamic fundamentalist charge that Western Civilization in general and the U.S.A. in particular is the “Great Satan” is not without an element of truth. It makes no sense for the U.S. Government to send our boys to fight Al Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan, while at the same time it embraces the social policies embodied in Bill 185 (as President Obama has done). Such policies only furnish further arguments for the fundamentalists in their efforts to gain more recruits for the war against the “Great Satan.”

Mark Kleiman’s summary is worth noting. The Archdiocese:

(1) cites the death penalty for homosexuality under sharia as evidence for the objective wrongness of the practice, without even hinting that carrying out the death penalty in such cases might not be the right thing to do, (2) offers suicide bombing as evidence of the moral health of extremist Islam (by contrast with the self-absorption it attributes to gays), and (3) says that the identification of the United States as the Great Satan is “not without an element of truth.”

Just remember: If you think that there are important commonalities of thoughts and purposes between the Islamic extremists currently ruling Iran and running the Taliban and the Christian extremists currently in control of the Vatican, you’re just an anti-Catholic bigot, because there’s no evidence whatever behind your fears.

book-section-book-cover2 Dwight Furrow is author of

Reviving the Left: The Need to Restore Liberal Values in America

For political commentary by Dwight Furrow visit: www.revivingliberalism.com

 

Au Contraire October 27, 2009

Posted by Dwight Furrow in Current Events, Dwight Furrow's Posts, Philosophy.
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Last week I posted twice (here and here) about the limits of contrarians who seek publicity by going against the conventional wisdom. Both Bill Maher in his diatribes against the flu vaccine in particular and Western medicine in general, and Brownless and Lenzer, the authors of a poorly researched article in Atlantic Monthly on the effectiveness of flu vaccine, are guilty of a kind of knee jerk response to conventional wisdom on an issue that is important to people and may cause harm if not properly understood.

But the conventional wisdom is sometimes wrong, so it is worth thinking about when being a contrarian is justified.

My short answer to this question is that “hit jobs” that cast doubt on the conventional wisdom  by oversimplifying the issue are never worth our attention. The point to remember is that if a contrarian is right about some issue, it typically makes the world more complicated, not less. The conventional wisdom is sometimes wrong but it is seldom without any reason or evidence behind it. Usually, people who hold conventional beliefs, especially in the sciences and social sciences that are evidence-based, have good reasons for holding the conventional belief.

When doubt is cast on those “good reasons” we are faced with attempting to confirm the new data, weighing the actual import of the new variables, assessing whether the new variables will produce multiple effects, and separating what was right about the old view from what was wrong about it and trying to accommodate the new information with what is worth saving of the old.

This process produces reactions, counter-reactions, and uncertainty among interest groups, and in the end the radical “new” insight is seldom as revolutionary as it appeared.

What matters then is that contrarians, or people who write about them, need to stay focused on the difficult search for truth and the need for nuance rather than bold statements that succumb to the temptation to be cute, hip, and cynical. Unfortunately, they are usually looking for entertainment value or promoting an ideology. Thus, contrarians are usually misleading.

This article at The Economist.com provides lots of examples of contrarianism run amok. (The new book by the authors of Freakonomics, called Superfreakonomics, is the latest example.) But there are others:

The first time I ever encountered an argument that I would now clearly recognise as “contrarian” was in elementary school, during Ronald Reagan’s presidential campaign, when I first heard someone argue the supply-side case that lowering taxes would raise government revenues. Another early encounter I recall was my father describing a social scientist interviewed on NPR who’d argued that the main effect of minimum-wage laws was to raise the unemployment level for poor urban youth. And it’s been my experience ever since that contrarian arguments tend to skew rightwards.

I doubt that the right has a monopoly on contrarians.

At any rate, it would be good if contrarians were devoted to encouraging people to think more. Unfortunately it is quite the opposite. To the extent they encourage us to oversimplify matters they encourage us to think less.

 

book-section-book-cover2 Dwight Furrow is author of

Reviving the Left: The Need to Restore Liberal Values in America

For political commentary by Dwight Furrow visit: www.revivingliberalism.com