Friday Music Blogging September 18, 2009
Posted by Dwight Furrow in Animal Intelligence, Art and Music, Dwight Furrow's Posts, Science.Tags: animals and music
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I have always wondered why my son’s dog doesn’t care about music.
Beethoven, Coltrane, Radiohead—it doesn’t matter, he is indifferent.
Here is a study of monkeys that explains why:
Monkeys don’t care much for human music, but apparently they will groove to their own beat.
Previous experiments have shown that tamarin monkeys prefer silence to Mozart, and they don’t respond emotionally to human music the way people do. But when a psychologist and a musician collaborated to compose music based on the pitch, tone and tempo of tamarin calls, they discovered that the species-specific music significantly affected monkey behavior and emotional response.
“Different species may have different things that they react to and enjoy differently in music,” said psychologist Charles Snowdon of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, who published the paper Tuesday in Biology Letters with composer David Teie of the University of Maryland. “If we play human music, we shouldn’t expect the monkeys to enjoy that, just like when we play the music that David composed, we don’t enjoy it too much.”
Indeed, the monkey music sounds shrill and unpleasant to human ears. Each of the 30-second pieces below were produced with a cello and Teie’s voice, based on specific features from recordings of tamarin monkey calls. The first “song” is based on fear calls from an upset monkey, while the second one contains soothing sounds based on the vocalizations of a relaxed animal.
If you are curious check out the “monkey music” at the linked site.
Autonomy Without Choice September 17, 2009
Posted by Dwight Furrow in Dwight Furrow's Posts, Philosophy, Political Philosophy.Tags: autonomy, Mathew Crawford
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My current philosophical preoccupation is with the concept of autonomy, which refers to our capacity for self-rule, self-control, and self-direction. This is a central concept in ethics and political theory because it defines in part what it means to be a person and grounds assignments of moral responsibility and political rights.
But I think our tradition has largely misunderstood this concept.
The dominant theories of autonomy hold that an action is autonomous if it is the product of one’s deliberative choice. The basic idea is that if I think about and endorse an action (assuming I haven’t been manipulated in some way), then it belongs to me and is an autonomous act. I have freely chosen it.
I have been working on a series of papers (the first is available here) that attempt to show why this is wrong-headed.
My basic objections are that (1) it entails that many of our actions—all the ones that we don’t reflect on and don’t choose—are not autonomous, and (2) it assumes that a kind of self-sufficient independence is the defining feature of personhood.
In other words, the standard model thinks of being in control of the self as a subjective decision. We are free to the extent our actions obey our own directives—the self is defined by its will.
I just happened to come across this passage from an intriguing book, Matthew Crawford’s Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inquiry into the Value of Work, that explains quite clearly why our received ideas of autonomy are wrong.
The errors of freedomism may be illuminated by thinking about music. One can’t be a musician without learning to play a particular instrument, subjecting one’s fingers to the discipline of of frets or keys. The musician’s power of expression is founded upon a prior obedience; her musical agency is built up from an ongoing submission. To what? To her teacher, perhaps, but this is incidental rather than primary — there is such a thing as the self-taught musician. Her obedience rather is to the mechanical realities of her instrument, which in turn answer to certain natural necessities of music that can be expressed mathematically. … These facts do not arise from the human will, and there is no altering them. I believe the example of the musician sheds light on the basic character of human agency, namely, that it arises only within concrete limits that are not of our making. These limits need not be physical; the important thing is rather that they are external to the self. (p. 64) (h/t to Manyul Im’s blog)
Learning to play an instrument is a matter of conforming to reality—deliberative choice is not directly relevant.
The point here can be generalized to most of our embodied interactions in the world—from driving a car to playing basketball to caring for loved ones. (This is why we talk of “falling in love” not “choosing to love”) The self is in control only when it conforms to the realities of the world in which we act and we often do this without reflection and without making conscious choices.
Of course, when things go wrong, when our effortless actions fail, then we have to consciously reflect on what we are doing and make choices. Rational reflection is important. But it seems to me the standard model of autonomy takes the exception and makes it the rule.
Dwight Furrow is author of
Reviving the Left: The Need to Restore Liberal Values in America
For political commentary by Dwight Furrow visit: www.revivingliberalism.com
Media Ethics 101 and the Flu September 16, 2009
Posted by Nina Rosenstand in Current Events, Nina Rosenstand's Posts.1 comment so far
I apologize for being silent so long, and leaving the entire blogging effort to Dwight—I have been without a functioning computer for almost a month. A little lesson in planning for the future: Back up your files! Which I had done, but the hassle is enormous, even so.
Well, it looks like the H1N1 flu season is upon us, so it’s time to reevaluate the situation—not the urgency or non-urgency of the medical situation, which (as a comment so kindly pointed out) I am not qualified to judge, not being a medical expert, but the issue of media ethics, which is an area I do know something about.
In April and May, when the Swine/H1N1 flu made its first appearance, we were inundated with fever-pitch headlines in the news media, mostly based on rumors and random news reports. In a fairly quiet news season, the media glommed on to stories of the spreading flu, and apparently delighted in sharing gory gossip en lieu of solid information—which of course wasn’t available yet. That was my main concern, and complaint, when I wrote the “Hype Virus” blog in May—not that the flu itself shouldn’t be taken seriously, but that fear mongering serves little purpose other than driving up ratings, and that gossip-driven fear can spread like a virus. But now the media voices seem to have changed their pitch, mainly because information is now available. (And may we surmise, also because there are juicier news stories around for the moment?) This is a good development; regardless of their motivation, it is commendable when the news media disseminate useful info overall rather than attempt to whip up a storm of fear with fat headlines, spinning logos and dramatic theme music.
So what are we told now? Mostly bare facts: the flu is very contagious, but not (at this point) as lethal as feared. Vaccine is being produced, and will be made available. Guidelines are in place as to who should receive the vaccine first. These groups have been identified:
In addition to people ages 6 months to 24 years old, other target groups include any person up to 50 years old who has a chronic disease, caretakers of children 6 months of age, pregnant women and health workers…
And common sense advice about how to keep each other a little safer from germs is being shared.
This overall mostly responsible, mature media approach may of course change at any moment: It is balancing on an Aristotelian edge between hysteria and complacency, influenced by an array of factors in addition to (or maybe even instead of) what used to be the job of the news media: to inform, as objectively as possible. And this is where the responsibility of the news consumer comes in, because that, too, is part of Media Ethics 101: We need to keep our wits about us and evaluate the situation based on the information we receive, the source of the information, our own experience and our common sense.
So this is what I share with my students (who are coming down with the flu in increasing numbers, judging from their e-mails to me): We must give up on our traditional work-ethic that says you’re supposed to come to work/school no matter how you feel. That has never been a sensible rule, and now it should fall by the wayside. Learn to recognize the flu symptoms: body aches, fever and a headache, plus possibly a sore throat and congestion. If you’re sick and contagious, stay at home and drink fluids until at least one day after the fever is gone! For your own sake (for the selfish among you) as well as for your fellow students, co-workers and teachers/bosses (for those of you who are community-oriented). Bosses and instructors should understand that this is the right thing to do under the circumstances, and not necessarily evidence of a slacker attitude. And if you’re experiencing flu symptoms, keep a sensible distance to others (more than 4 feet), and please cough or sneeze in your elbow, not in your hand, or on other people for that matter…and above all, whether we’re feeling sick or not, we should wash our hands, incessantly. After touching pens in banks and grocery stores, door knobs, school keyboards, and grocery carts, etc., wash your hands. And don’t touch your nose, mouth and eyes unless you have clean hands! That’s not all there is to be said, but it’s a start. And good advice in any season.
Above all, like they say in A Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, don’t panic. It’s a flu, and flus can kill, but as of now it seems to be no worse than any other flu, just different. Read and listen to the media reports, evaluate and try to sift hype from facts if you can, and take care of yourself and those close to you. Be safe.
Why Fairness Should Not Be the Foundation of Liberalism September 15, 2009
Posted by Dwight Furrow in Dwight Furrow's Posts, Ethics, Political Philosophy.Tags: capabilities, illegal immigration and health care, Justice as fairness, what is liberalism
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“It’s so unfair” is one of the first morally-based complaints that children make, and as adults, unfairness can get our hackles up. Even some animals seem to have a sense of fairness. Some versions of liberal theory treat fairness as the most fundamental political value. But fairness is a highly contested concept, fraught with ambiguity and should not be the basis of liberal political theory.
Is it fair that Alex Rodriquez makes millions of dollars but people equally talented and far more useful to society earn a fraction of his salary?
According to one meaning of “fairness” there is nothing unfair about Rodriquez’s salary. If by “fair” we mean that rules are applied equally to everyone, then assuming A-Rod and the Yankees freely entered into their contract, both parties are playing by the rules of contractual agreement—every other player and team has the same opportunity to negotiate.
Fairness understood as “equally subject to rules” is an important value but it is limited because the rules themselves may be unfair. One might argue that a compensation scheme that permits the marginally more talented Rodriquez to earn an astronomically higher salary than other players is itself unfair; or that a compensation scheme that pays a talented entertainer or athlete more than a doctor or teacher is unfair.
The intuition behind this kind of judgment is that fairness is tied to what one deserves. If we base what someone deserves on their contribution to society then Rodriquez probably doesn’t deserve his salary. But what is the proper basis for what philosophers call desert claims?
One dominant strand of liberalism has a general answer to this question. We deserve a distribution of goods based on our efforts and choices. But since none of us choose our families or genetic heritage, and how we do in life is dependent on such factors that are outside our control, it is not obvious that we deserve anything. Rodriquez was just lucky to have the genetic endowment and developmental opportunities he had. But his birthright is not deserved; and neither is that of someone disadvantaged by birth. This entails that a society based on fairness, on what people deserve, should compensate people for their bad luck, since they don’t deserve their fate, and such a society should refuse to excessively compensate the fortunate because they don’t deserve their advantages.
But this is a problem for liberalism because: (1) it is counter-intuitive from the standpoint of common sense, and thus citizens will resist it. Most people are morally bothered only by intentional unfairness. We seem to accept unfairness when it is a matter of luck but don’t like it when someone is stacking the deck against us, and (2) such a compensation scheme will crowd out other things we value.
Sometimes getting good outcomes requires that we tolerate unfairness. It may be unfair that talented, diligent workers are laid off in times of economic contraction but it may be necessary to save the firm. It may be unfair to put federal money into saving Wall St. bankers while more deserving people lost out in the financial collapse. But doing so may have saved the financial system. Enhancing the capabilities and resources of the already talented and successful will sometimes produce goods that benefit everyone even though that seems unfair to the less gifted who may be denied those resources. Achievement is likely only under conditions where people who are already fortunate are allowed to continue to flourish.
Regardless of how many resources we devote to it, we can never prevent bad luck from influencing outcomes without disabling the fortunate which is itself a morally monstrous thing to do.
Life isn’t fair. But there is not much we can do about that.
How then should liberals think about treatment of the disadvantaged?
What is morally disturbing is not that one person might have been lucky in life’s lottery and another less fortunate—rather it is morally disturbing that some person has too few resources and capabilities to lead a decent life. It is more important to arrange social institutions to enable the less fortunate to flourish than it is to ensure fairness or equality.
We should aim at improving the condition of the worst off, not because their condition is unfair, but because we are concerned about their welfare. Compassion not fairness is the foundation of liberalism.
We cannot disentangle questions of fairness from questions of what one deserves. But determining what one deserves requires separating out good or bad fortune from what one is genuinely responsible for—and this is an impossible task. None of us really know where our capabilities, personality or character traits come from. What is clear is that, for the most part, we didn’t choose them. Thus, aiming at the fair outcome involves us in lots of contentious, unanswerable questions. It lacks moral clarity and allows conservatives to co-opt the moral high ground by injecting questions about deservingness into any discussion about the distribution of resources.
The current dustup about illegal immigrants receiving health care is an example of how excessive focus on fairness harms liberalism. It would be far better for all of us if illegal immigrants received health insurance, since they would be less susceptible to disease, more productive, and less a burden on emergency services. Conservatives rail that they don’t deserve it—and conservatives are right. They probably don’t.
But that should be irrelevant; compassion and a concern for our collective health should be the over-riding response. But one reason why what one deserves continues to be relevant is because liberals keep insisting on the foundational importance of fairness.
Dwight Furrow is author of
Reviving the Left: The Need to Restore Liberal Values in America
For political commentary by Dwight Furrow visit: www.revivingliberalism.com
The Tyranny of Kant September 14, 2009
Posted by Dwight Furrow in Dwight Furrow's Posts, Ethics, Philosophy, Political Philosophy.Tags: Kant, Morality and power
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This study is from the “well, duh” file but it is still interesting.
Are rules made to be broken — or obeyed? Newly published research suggests your answer to that question depends largely upon whether you are mulling it over from a position of power.
“In determining whether an act is right or wrong, the powerful focus on whether rules and principles are violated, whereas the powerless focus on the consequences,” states the study “How Power Influences Moral Thinking,” in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. “For this reason, the powerful are also more inclined to stick to the rules — irrespective of whether this has positive or negative effects — while the powerless are more inclined to make exceptions.” […]
…50 students were assigned to play the role of either manager or employee of a fictional company. “Participants were presented with two reward systems, of which one was outcome-based and another rule-based, and were asked to indicate which of the two criteria they thought was the fairest.”
The “managers” were more inclined to vote for the rules-based criterion, while the “employees” were more likely to contend that the ultimate results of a worker’s efforts were more important than whether they strictly followed company guidelines.
For the uninitiated, philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that morality is fundamentally rule guided. But as far as I know, Kant was not in charge of anything (except himself).
Actually, my reference to Kant here is a bit unfair to Kant. I don’t think this study tells us much about whether moral reasoning ought to be rule-guided or outcome guided.
The researchers did find one exception to this pattern. In a final test, which was constructed so that rule-based thinking would not work to the advantage of the powerful, participants in the high-power category were less inclined than their low-power counterparts to endorse playing by the rules. Self-interest apparently trumps abstract ethical concepts.
Hence, this belongs in the “duh” file. People in power like rules because they make or enforce the rules and can manipulate them to help preserve their dominance. People who lack power don’t like rules because they had no hand in devising them, can’t control their enforcement, and they work to their disadvantage.
Of course, anyone who has held a job already knows this.
Kant had a job—he was a professor of philosophy; but perhaps his department chair was benign. At any rate, I don’t think Kant was sufficiently aware of how rules can serve the powerful.
Although, apparently, he was right about the importance of autonomy.
Dwight Furrow is author of
Reviving the Left: The Need to Restore Liberal Values in America
For political commentary by Dwight Furrow visit: www.revivingliberalism.com
The Adults Are In Charge (for now) September 13, 2009
Posted by Dwight Furrow in Current Events, Ethics, politics.Tags: conservatism and liberalism, Joe Wilson, Juan Cole
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As many of you know, some of my work is devoted to characterizing the cavernous moral fissure that has opened up between our dominant political ideologies.
That fissure was clearly evident last week in the aftermath of the sordid spectacle that occurred on the floor of the chamber during Obama’s address to a joint session of Congress.
As usual, historian and blogger Juan Cole gets the characterization exactly right.
On September 9, 2009, a man named Joe Wilson, a congressman from South Carolina, yelled “You lie!” at the president as he was defending his universal health coverage proposals from nutty rightwing smears.
Joe Wilson, whom the Health Industry lobby has given $244,196 in campaign contributions, was of course himself lying when he implied that President Obama’s plan will cover illegal immigrants. It will not.
President Obama graciously accepted Wilson’s subsequent apology, even though no modern president has been yelled at that way by a minor rural politician.
On July 6, 2003 another Joe Wilson called a president a liar, in an opinion essay for the New York Times. This Joe Wilson had bravely stared down Saddam Hussein in fall, 1990 as acting ambassador in Baghdad and been commended for his courage by George H. W. Bush.
George W. Bush had falsely alleged in his State of the Union Speech that Iraq had recently bought yellowcake uranium from the West African country of Niger. The allegation was based on a clumsily forged document that had been discounted by the CIA and was proven false within 24 hours when finally shared with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Wilson’s complaint that the assertion had been false and that he had shown it false before the war was deeply embarrassing to the Bush administration. It responded by smearing Wilson and then attempting to out his wife, Valerie Plame, as an undercover CIA operative working against Iran’s nuclear program. Plame’s career was destroyed and all her known agents and contacts around the world were burned; some of them may have quietly been killed (we have no way of knowing). Ultimately, the truth of the anti-Wilson, anti-Plame campaign came out and Richard Bruce Cheney’s chief of staff, was found guilty of an attempted cover-up. Cheney had ordered the outing of Plame; it happened via another route, but Cheney was conniving at it. Cheney is a traitor and should be rotting in jail.
Note that the first Joe Wilson was dead wrong, but that the Obama administration responded in a gentlemanly way to his charge.
The Bush-Cheney administration, in contrast, attempted to besmirch the reputation and the life of a dedicated lifetime civil servant because he spoke the truth to the president.The story of the two Joe Wilsons and how they were treated is the story of two visions of America. The Bush-Cheney vision is a nightmarish landscape of blighted lives and cruel indifference to basic human decency. The Obama vision is just the Golden Rule, with which the people who vote for the evil Joe Wilson typically profess acquaintance.
Ancient history? Water under the bridge? Let’s move on; look forward, not backward? Well, no. As Cole says:
The evil Joe Wilson (R-SC) is the remnant of Cheneyism in this new America, painfully being born from the rubble made by the old.
Sometimes the paradoxical adage “the more things change, the more they remain the same” seems about right.
Dwight Furrow is author of
Reviving the Left: The Need to Restore Liberal Values in America
For political commentary by Dwight Furrow visit: www.revivingliberalism.com
Friday Beer Blogging September 11, 2009
Posted by Dwight Furrow in Dwight Furrow's Posts, Food and Drink.Tags: German vs. American Beer
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This article comparing German and American beer is quite interesting. The writer is an American writing for a German publication. And he argues persuasively that American beer is better. (His German readers were less than enthusiastic)
Of course he is not talking about the Coors-Budweiser-Miller swill. He is promoting the fast-growing micro-brew market. (Germany has their own inferior mass-market brews which, to my taste, are a bit better than their American counterparts, but not by much.)
On quality, variety, and innovation he rates American micro-brews better than the brew-pub offerings from Germany.
I’m no expert on beer but I have done some beer tasting in Germany. On quality, I think it’s basically a wash; both countries make wonderful beer. The linked article confuses price with quality. German beers are not luxury items—their quality beers will not be outrageously expensive. Nevertheless, their meticulous attention to detail and quality ingredients make wonderful beer.
But on innovation and variety American beers are hands down better.
But what makes such comparisons difficult are the vast differences in the two beer cultures. In Germany, every city has their own style about which they are quite proud and they serve mostly that style with slight variations. In Munich you will drink primarily Hefeweisen, in Cologne Kolsch, in Bamberg Rauchbier (smoked beer). (Pilsner is available all over but with subtle regional differences). They are not much interested in variety (and don’t even ask for Belgium beer!)
In America, brew pubs are always innovating, searching for new styles, flavor combinations, and new methods. As the linked article points out:
To some extent the difference is unbridgeable–Germans are uninterested in innovation or even a wide variety of choice, because they feel they have already found perfection. Americans are dazzled by the possibilities of new angles and avenues, and pursue them relentlessly, even if it means breaking rules. Is there is a better statement about the basic differences between European and American culture?
I adore Hefeweizen, especially at 10:00 in the morning with Weisswurst, which is their mid-morning snack in Munich.
But if I lived in Germany, I would grow weary of the lack of variety.
Abusing Philosophy September 9, 2009
Posted by Dwight Furrow in Dwight Furrow's Posts, Philosophy, religion, Science.Tags: compatibility of religion and science, David Hume, problem of induction
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Sholto Byrnes, writing in the New Statesman, commits philosophical sins.
He begins by lamenting the lack of tolerance he increasingly finds in the writings of atheists who dismiss religion as mere superstition.
…many of those who seek to defend reason show themselves to be equally unreasonable and inflexible in their views. A gentle and accommodating agnosticism has given way to an angry and insistent atheism that sees offence as the best way to defend rationalism and science.
As he rightly points out, such dismissals fail to take seriously the beliefs of most people on the planet.
But I don’t share his lamentations. The fact that lots of people believe something doesn’t make it true, and surely it is appropriate for intellectuals to criticize conventional beliefs they think are false. If you think a belief is superstitious nonsense, in the context of a philosophical debate, I don’t see why you shouldn’t call it that if you can back it up.
But tolerance is a good thing, when it is reciprocated, and if someone objects to the “tone” of one’s remarks, in the interests of civility, moderation can often enhance a discussion. Whatever.
But Byrnes’ objections go further. He is claiming that atheists are “unreasonable” and “inflexible” suggesting that their views are held dogmatically and that their arguments are flawed. He would rather see a “gentle and accommodating agnosticism”.
So what is his argument?
Much of the current noisy argument comes down to the status of knowledge, and specifically what is commonly deemed as the unbridgeable gulf between “revealed” knowledge and that of science – which Dawkins’s ally Daniel Dennett once told me was the “only game in town” when it came to “facts, and the explanation of facts”.
But this is an overly narrow view. Religion consists of far more than “revealed” truths, which are, in any case, obviously of a different kind from those derived from theoretical and empirical study. More importantly, this is to claim far too much for that corpus of conjecture we call human knowledge. As a student, I read David Hume’s argument that although we may believe the sun will rise tomorrow, we cannot know it. For me, it was as profound and as revelatory as any religious experience, and as convincing as any scientific proof.
What is his basis for claiming revelation is a form of “knowledge” or “truth”? He never says. Instead he tries to cast doubt on the methods of induction in science.
His entire argument rests on a sophomoric understanding of the work of David Hume, the 18th Century empiricist.
Hume famously argued that our ability to make inductive inferences about the world rests on the assumption that nature is uniform and the future will resemble the past. But this assumption can’t be justified. Using past experience to justify belief in the future uniformity of nature will assume the very principle we want to prove. Furthermore, information about the interaction of physical objects goes beyond what is immediately perceived. We see the “constant conjunction” of two events—morning arriving and the sun coming up, or one billiard ball striking another followed by the movement of the ball. The events repeatedly happen at roughly the same time and in a particular order. But because we cannot directly observe all the details of the causal story that explains why the sun rises in the morning, we can’t really know it. Our belief that the sun will rise tomorrow rests on a kind of habit or custom, according to Hume.
Even if one accepts Hume’s view of induction, it still does not warrant putting science and religion on the same epistemic footing. Science is able to confirm the constant conjunction of events that are hypothesized to be related even if we don’t know the entire causal story of how they are related. By contrast, religion can claim no controlled observations of constantly conjoined events. Its so-called revelations are episodic, subjective, and enjoy nothing like the constant reinforcement of our ordinary beliefs about the causal relationships between events.
Moreover, Hume’s skepticism about induction is no longer warranted. The fact that we cannot directly experience causal connections, does not entail that we cannot know of their existence. This sort of radical empiricism was rejected by most philosophers many years ago. Furthermore, in the 18th Century, Hume had little knowledge of the micro-physical structure of reality which is inaccessible to the naked eye. Today, we have a much more thorough understanding of the causal mechanisms that explain ordinary events.
Can we be certain that nature is uniform and that the future will be sufficiently like the past to warrant belief in causal laws? No. For all we know, some unknown factor might disrupt the world as we know it and transform the laws that govern nature. But our confidence that reality is relatively stable is reinforced constantly every moment of the day.
We can’t be certain about any empirical claim but scientists and most philosophers long ago gave up the idea that knowledge claims are warranted only if they can be known with certainty. We do quite well with the trial and error, probabilistic reasoning that science employs.
There are still philosophical debates about the precise nature of causation and inductive inference but these debates don’t give rise to global skepticism about science. And they certainly give us no reason to think there is some special domain of religious “truth”.
Byrnes ruminations are not based on tolerance but on special pleading for religious claims and ignorance regarding epistemology.
Dwight Furrow is Professor of Philosophy at San Diego Mesa College and the author of Reviving the Left: The Need to Restore Liberal Values in America
For political commentary by Dwight Furrow visit: www.revivingliberalism.com
Why Are Politicians Amoral Pimps? September 8, 2009
Posted by Dwight Furrow in Dwight Furrow's Posts, Ethics, politics.Tags: ethics and politicians, Matt Yglesias, moral psychology and politics
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They aren’t, at least no more so than the rest of us.
…I’ve come to be increasingly baffled by the high degree cynicism and immorality displayed in big-time politics. For example, Senators who genuinely do believe that carbon dioxide emissions are contributing to a global climate crisis seem to think nothing of nevertheless taking actions that endanger the welfare of billions of people on the grounds that acting otherwise would be politically problematic in their state. In other words, they don’t want to do the right thing because their self-interest points them toward doing something bad. But it’s impossible to imagine these same Senators stabbing a homeless person in a dark DC alley to steal his shoes. And what’s more, the entire political class would be (rightly!) shocked and appalled by the specter of a Senator murdering someone for personal gain. Yet it’s actually taken for granted that “my selfish desires dictate that I do x” constitutes a legitimate reason to do the wrong thing on important legislation.
I think this is a really important question that goes to the heart of the difficulty democracies have in solving problems. (for various responses to Matt’s query see here and here and Matt’s follow up here.)
The knee jerk, cynical response is to mutter that they are just bought off by the campaign donors to whom they must cater. But that doesn’t provide the explanation Matt seeks. Most politicians would not actually kill someone because their campaign donors want them dead. So why do they allow their parochial interests to overwhelm their moral judgment on big issues like climate change legislation where the welfare of millions is at stake?
Another cynical response is that people who are excessively power hungry or greedy self-select as politicians—so they lack a moral conscience to begin with. But that doesn’t explain why they would not consider murder but routinely allow millions to die because of their policies. Moreover, the premise is flawed. Congresspersons don’t have much power as individuals, except for the few who become committee chairs or party leaders which takes a very long time. And although some parlay their stint in office into lucrative lobbying gigs, I suspect only a few get fabulously rich. It’s not a bad job but given the obstacles to gaining office and the arduous task of continually campaigning it isn’t obvious it is a straightforward way of gaining riches or power.
They may possess some other peculiar characteristic such as a narcissistic personality or an excessive need for approval but that wouldn’t preclude them taking credit for sweeping legislation that saves lives rather than small-bore catering to local interests.
I don’t think any of the cynical explanations work.
Rather, the explanation is that sustaining a concern for the welfare of distant, unknowable others is hard. Such a concern is not regulated by a personal relationship and it is neither concrete nor immediate. In short, it requires, not only abstract thinking, but a kind of sustained caring that lacks an immediate emotional tug. On issues such as climate change, much of the threat lies in the future. We don’t know precisely who will be harmed or when they will be harmed or to what extent. And responsibility for these harms will not fall on a single person but will be distributed across thousands of people who could have halted climate change but did not.
It is a fact about human psychology that people typically discount the future, exaggerate uncertainty, and avoid responsibility when it is diffuse. Causing statistically predictable death is not like causing an actual death.
In contrast to preventing climate change, killing a person involves immediate, personal contact, and full responsibility for a result about which one is virtually certain. There are powerful psychological impediments to committing murder that disappear when contemplating temporally remote “statistical harm”.
So politicians fail to concern themselves with the common good because they are, like most of the rest of us, concerned with the personal, the palpable, and the concrete. And politicians if they are to stay in power must signal to their constituents that they share their values (and moral psychology). Most people frame moral questions in personal terms and emphasize local concerns. So do politicians. When you have citizens who refuse to use energy saving, compact fluorescent light bulbs because they don’t glow as warmly as incandescent bulbs, it is apparent that the problem is not with the politicians only.
And we are probably limited in our moral imaginations because evolution designed us to focus our practical reason on immediate, local concerns.
This is the challenge that liberalism confronts in tackling long-term, global problems. It requires a kind of moral and intellectual commitment that most people find unfamiliar at best and threatening at worst. It was in part a desire to provide a solution to this challenge that motivated me to write Reviving the Left.
Of course, not everyone has such a limited moral imagination. Matt Yglesias imagines:
If some weird situation somehow resulted in me becoming a United States Senator, I would spend six years making trouble, having fun, and trying to do the right thing. Probably I’d lose a primary or something since I wasn’t bothering to raise money or campaign. Then I’d right a book about it.
I suspect Matt thinks this way because he has a background in philosophy and because he strikes me as a bit of a utilitarian. Making abstract, impersonal judgments is part of the territory.
But I don’t think the practical reason of most human beings works that way.
So I quite agree with Matt:
I think the underlying issue is one of the most profound ones humanity faces so I don’t think I have it all figured out.
No one does, but we better get it figured out–quickly.
X-posted at www.revivingliberalism.com
Dwight Furrow is author of
Reviving the Left: The Need to Restore Liberal Values in America
For political commentary by Dwight Furrow visit: www.revivingliberalism.com
How to Become A Communist September 8, 2009
Posted by Dwight Furrow in Current Events, Dwight Furrow's Posts, politics.Tags: Max Weber, Obama’s address to school children
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On Tuesday, Obama intends to broadcast a message to the nation’s schoolchildren stressing the importance of hard work and staying in school.
Conservatives are apoplectic about this:
Florida GOP Chairman Jim Greer released a statement this week accusing Obama of using taxpayer money to “indoctrinate” children.
“As the father of four children, I am absolutely appalled that taxpayer dollars are being used to spread President Obama’s socialist ideology,” Greer said.
I have read my Max Weber and was under the impression that an ethic stressing hard work was the unpinning of capitalism.
So the Protestant ethic leads to socialism? Who knew?
