Philosophy On The Mesa

I’m often asked by my students what they’ll be able to do with philosophy as a major. The latest answer, according to the New York Times and The Guardian, is, anything you want! Philosophy has emerged as the latest fad major, not for the first time, but this time around it actually appears as if there is some solid reasoning going on, not just in the minds of philosophy students, but in the minds of employers. According to The Guardian,

“Figures from the Higher Education Statistics Agency show philosophy graduates, once derided as unemployable layabouts, are in growing demand from employers. The number of all graduates in full-time and part-time work six months after graduation has risen by 9% between 2002-03 and 2005-06; for philosophy graduates it has gone up by 13%.

It is in the fields of finance, property development, health, social work and the nebulous category of “business” that those versed in Plato and Kant are most sought after. In “business”, property development, renting and research, 76% more philosophy graduates were employed in 2005-06 than in 2002-03. In health and social work, 9% more….

…Fiona Czerniawska, director of the Management Consultancies Association’s think tank, says: “A philosophy degree has trained the individual’s brain and given them the ability to provide management-consulting firms with the sort of skills that they require and clients demand. These skills can include the ability to be very analytical, provide clear and innovative thinking, and question assumptions.”"

 This is, of course, what we philosophy instructors have been saying for years, but we’ve generally considered it a nice bonus added to the major benefit of actually enjoying doing philosophy. And according to the New York Times, it is a lot of fun—and it is also useful (hmmmmm):

“Jenna Schaal-O’Connor, a 20-year-old sophomore who is majoring in cognitive science and linguistics, said philosophy had other perks. She said she found many male philosophy majors interesting and sensitive. “That whole deep existential torment,” she said. “It’s good for getting girlfriends.””

In Spokane, WA a trial has just ended with a Not Guilty verdict: One night in November 2005 a motorist, Clifford Helm, was driving on the wrong side of the road and plowed into a car with a father and his five children; all five children died in the crash. Since Helm refused to talk to the police, there was suspicion of drugs or alcohol being involved, but that was apparently not the case. At trial, the prosecution claimed he was on the cellphone, having an argument with his wife; the defense claimed he’d had a coughing spell and fainted. There was no medical evidence of a fainting spell, and the cellphone records were deleted by mistake by the prosecution, so it came down to whether the jury believed that this was vehicular homicide or an accident. They went with “accident” (involuntary manslaughter was apparently not an option), and Helm and his cellphone are free to drive on.

            That’s the short version of the story. What I would like to share with you is a newspaper column/blog about the case, written by Spokesman-Review columnist Rebecca Mack. In her column, “Still seeking explanation for tragedy,” Mack analyzes the underlying reasons why this case has been occupying the minds of the community, and continues to do so: She says that it isn’t so much that people are unhappy with the verdict because they want revenge or retribution for the five little children—they just want to understand, so that the same thing will not happen to them or their kids, on some dark road, and the verdict (and the driver’s reticence) doesn’t offer anyone that comfort. In philosophical terms, the case reveals the absurdity and enormity of unpredictable life, and the powerlessness of every one of us when trying to take all the preventive measures that will keep us alive. Sometimes we can, but not all the time. Essentially, what Mack has uncovered is our narrative urge, the need to tell stories that make sense, so we are not overwhelmed by the meaninglessness of the universe. And (in case you now think that I think everything is meaningless) then it is up to us to create the meaning, maybe a partial little meaning, within our own little sector of reality. Many of us do that, anyway, and sometimes even appropriately, casting blame on (perhaps) the county’s failure in ensuring that the signage was sufficient, or on cellphone companies that endanger the public. Some of us are attracted to the concept of karma; some of us choose to think that there is a higher meaning which will be revealed to us at some point when we are no longer part of this reality. Some of us just hug our loved ones—people and pets—and hope for the best. The surviving parents who lost their five children are Mennonites, and have invited the driver into their midst, having forgiven him for the pain he has caused—because they have a Narrative that works for them. It probably isn’t a narrative that works for most of us, and that is why the story of the driver who killed the five children is so disturbing—it is complete in its incompleteness, so to speak. There is no illusion of comfort in the verdict; if we want comfort, we have to seek and find it ourselves.

Fun discussion over at “The Garden of Forking Paths” about new studies concerning hard determinism. If I can extricate myself from grading papers, I’ll put a post together about it–in the meantime, enjoy this link: http://gfp.typepad.com/the_garden_of_forking_pat/2008/02/why-reading-def.html

There is an interesting and important discussion going on at Brian Leiter’s blog regarding the proper characterization of naturalism and its relation to philosophy.

Naturalism is the view that reality consists only of the natural world. The issue is whether the language and methods of science are sufficient to understand reality; or are there aspects of nature that must be understood philosophically.

Apparently, “Yes We Can” has an intellectual pedigree.

As usual Stephen Pinker is good on the science; not so good on the moral philosophy. Pinker’s recent article in the NYTimes on the science of morality begins by suggesting that, although most people would judge that Mother Theresa was more worthy of moral admiration than Bill Gates, such a judgement is an irrational illusion.

“Gates, in deciding what to do with his fortune, crunched the numbers and determined that he could alleviate the most misery by fighting everyday scourges in the developing world like malaria, diarrhea and parasites. Mother Teresa, for her part, extolled the virtue of suffering and ran her well-financed missions accordingly: their sick patrons were offered plenty of prayer but harsh conditions, few analgesics and dangerously primitive medical care….I doubt these examples will persuade anyone to favor Bill Gates over Mother Teresa for sainthood. But they show that our heads can be turned by an aura of sanctity, distracting us from a more objective reckoning of the actions that make people suffer or flourish. It seems we may all be vulnerable to moral illusions the ethical equivalent of the bending lines that trick the eye on cereal boxes and in psychology textbooks.

In other words, a rational point of view would lead us to judge moral worth based on the consequences of an action–utilitarianism.

But when Pinker describes the lastest research in moral psychology, that research shows why we are not utilitarians.

“Joshua Greene, a philosopher and cognitive neuroscientist, suggests that evolution equipped people with a revulsion to manhandling an innocent person. This instinct, he suggests, tends to overwhelm any utilitarian calculus that would tot up the lives saved and lost. The impulse against roughing up a fellow human would explain other examples in which people abjure killing one to save many, like euthanizing a hospital patient to harvest his organs and save five dying patients in need of transplants, or throwing someone out of a crowded lifeboat to keep it afloat.”

There is an interpersonal dimension of morality that includes emotional responses and reactive attitudes that often conflict with purely rational calculation, a view which is supported by MRI research in brain activity.

The moral goodness of Mother Theresa’s activity is not an illusion. It is the product of a well-functioning brain that responds to caring activities regardless of outcomes.

Aside from this peculiar account of moral illusion, Pinker’s essay is full of important information about the science of  morality.

Big Think launched its Beta version a few days ago. It apparently sees itself as an interactive platform to connect the global public with academics, pundits, and politicians on practical as well as more abstract questions.

It is an intriguing idea; it will be interesting to see it develop.

On the campaign trail Mike Huckabee makes repeated references to “vertical politics”. (See here)

Lots of people have been wondering what that means. David Domke, co-author of The God Strategy: How Religion Became A Political Weapon in America, has one hypothesis:

“This is definitely dog-whistle politics — that is, a message delivered in coded terminology and targeted to a particular subcultural group.  Conservative evangelicals often talk about the need to prioritize their vertical relationships with God first and foremost before worrying about horizontal relationships among people. It’s the individualized “get right with God” approach of conservative Protestantism.”

I don’t know if Domke is right about this but, if he is, it perfectly illustrates the dangers of a Huckabee presidency.

People who are willing to sacrifice their moral obligations to other persons are morally compromised. Morality is inherently interpersonal, inherently horizontal.

It is especially important to acknowledge the moral authority of other persons in democratic political relationships. Citizenship expresses the mutual obligations citizens have toward each other. We are accountable to each other, and democratically elected leaders are part of that system of mutual accountability.

As private persons in a liberal democracy we have a variety of other interpersonal commitments as well that may conflict with our role as citizens. But when we elect a President we expect that person to put the nation first, to give priority to his or her horizontal relationship with fellow citizens.

A candidate who admits he can’t adopt such a priority is disqualified from holding the office.

The Edge (an online magazine devoted to the intersection of culture and science) has a fascinating series of brief articles from 118 scientists, social scientists, and philosophers on what they have changed their minds about.

“When thinking changes your mind, that’s philosophy.
When God changes your mind, that’s faith.
When facts change your mind, that’s science.

WHAT HAVE YOU CHANGED YOUR MIND ABOUT? WHY?”

Check it out here.

Reuben Navarette argues that opposition to immigration is not really about jobs or border security. It is about culture.

“It’s the perception that the country is becoming more Hispanic, that Spanish is replacing English, that Hispanic immigrants are weakening American identity, and that Main Street is turning into Little Mexico. A leader of the vigilante Minuteman movement moronically called it the “colonization” of the United States.This sort of rhetoric is all about fear — that those who thrive in the dominant culture are losing their primacy, that the mainstream is being polluted by foreigners, and that our children are going to live in a world where they’re going to have to work a lot harder to keep up.”

Unfortunately, I think Navarette is spot on. The culture wars have always been about the perceived loss of a particular vision of American culture and the immigration controversy promises to fit comfortably into that interminable controversy over values that seems to have no end in sight.

There is an important philosophical issue that underlies this controversy. Philosopher Thom Brooks, in commenting on a recent paper by Samuel Scheffler, observes that:

“In essence, Scheffler’s argument is that what is of value about culture is not culture itself, but certain values that may (or may not) be present in a given culture. The suggestion is that rather than honour claims from culture, we should honour claims from values: “culture” should then drop from view.”

If Scheffler is right then, given that immigrants exhibit the values Americans are alleged to admire–hard work, family, religion, yearning for freedom etc.–it is hard to see why the influence of immigrant culture would induce a sense of loss on the part of the host communities. The values are not undermined; they persist in new cultural forms.

But I suspect Scheffler is not entirely right about this. Part of our attachment to culture is not attachment to a certain set of values. Rather, it is attachment to very particular persons, artifacts, practices, and narratives of one’s culture. It is  particular expressions of cultural patterns that matters most–the new, imported forms of expression don’t count. Hence, the sense of loss.

For we cosmopolitans, it is easy to find aesthetic value in new forms of cultural expression. But some folks do not find cosmopolitanism attractive. This fact does not augur well for putting the culture wars to rest.